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Abstract—Neural networks are increasingly used in security
applications for intrusion detection on industrial control systems.
In this work we examine two areas that must be considered for
their effective use. Firstly, is their vulnerability to adversarial
attacks when used in a time series setting. Secondly, is poten-
tial over-estimation of performance arising from data leakage
artefacts.
To investigate these areas we implement a long short-term
memory (LSTM) based intrusion detection system (IDS) which
effectively detects cyber-physical attacks on a water treatment
testbed representing a strong baseline IDS.
For investigating adversarial attacks we model two different
white box attackers. The first attacker is able to manipulate
sensor readings on a subset of the Secure Water Treatment
(SWaT) system. By creating a stream of adversarial data the
attacker is able to hide the cyber-physical attacks from the IDS.
For the cyber-physical attacks which are detected by the IDS,
the attacker required on average 2.48 out of 12 total sensors
to be compromised for the cyber-physical attacks to be hidden
from the IDS. The second attacker model we explore is an L∞
bounded attacker who can send fake readings to the IDS, but to
remain imperceptible, limits their perturbations to the smallest
L∞ value needed.
Additionally, we examine data leakage problems arising from
tuning for F1 score on the whole SWaT attack set and propose
a method to tune detection parameters that does not utilise any
attack data. If attack after-effects are accounted for then our new
parameter tuning method achieved an F1 score of 0.811±0.0103.
Index Terms—machine learning, adversarial examples, security
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning systems are known to be vulnerable to
adversarial attacks at test time. By applying small changes
to an input an attacker can cause a machine learning system
to mis-classify with a high degree of success. There has been
much work on both developing more powerful attacks [1] as
well as defences [2]. However, the majority of adversarial
machine learning research is focused on the image domain,
with consideration of the different challenges that arise within
other fields needed [3].
This phenomenon of adversarial examples becomes par-
ticularly pertinent when aiming to defend machine learn-
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ing systems operating in a direct security domain. Machine
learning, and specifically deep learning, systems frequently
outperform other methods in detecting cyber attacks [4]–[7].
The use of deep learning systems can therefore be of great
benefit, resulting in better defended cyber systems against
non-adaptive attackers. Yet, adversarial example vulnerability
means that adaptive attackers can pose an immediate risk.
Additionally, deep learning intrusion detection systems
(IDS) frequently use many hyperparameters. With little attack
data generally available, it is often difficult to form a distinct
attack validation set. Therefore, care must be taken in inter-
preting F1 scores which use all of the available attack data to
determine hyperparameter choices.
In this work we begin to determine a solution for these prob-
lems by considering how adversarial attacks can be mounted
on time series based IDS and analyse evaluation methodology.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We demonstrate the vulnerability of time series based
intrusion detection to adversarial examples and are able
to hide a range of real cyber-physical attacks from an
IDS on an industrial control system (ICS).
• We discuss potential pitfalls with tuning and evaluating
intrusion detection systems on the whole attack set of the
Secure Water Treatment (SWaT) dataset and illustrate that
unless the attack set is fully representative of all attacks
that can occur in the ICS then the reported F1 scores
will vary. We propose a baseline method which does not
use the attack dataset in any manner to detect the various
attacks.
• Finally, we present some benchmark results on a new
dataset collected by iTrust in July 2019 showing that
concept drift, even in a regular and relatively predictable
system like SWaT, requires consideration.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Adversarial Examples
One of the most common occurrences of adversarial exam-
ples in literature is in conducting evasion attacks. In an evasion
attack an attacker adds a perturbation to a datapoint x such
that a neural network will output different classes for x and
the perturbed datapoint xˆ. Commonly the distance, z = x− xˆ,
is measured by one of three different norms:
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• L∞ : max|zi|. This norm is the maximum change applied
to any feature in the input.
• L0 : #{i|zi 6= 0}. This represents the total number of
features that can be altered. The selected features can be
modified by any desired amount.
• L2 :
√∑
i z
2
i The L2 norm is the Euclidean distance
between the original and perturbed datapoint.
There are a range of different attack crafting algorithms of
differing speed and strength operating under different norms.
For example, patch attacks perturb a complete section of an
image, representing a L0 bound, and can be used to create
adversarial stickers [8] and street signs [9] to fool image
classifiers. In terms of L∞ bounds one of the earliest attacks
investigated, the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [10],
can quickly generate adversarial samples. It functions by
perturbing each pixel in an image by fixed proportions to the
sign of the gradient with respect to the desired class an attacker
wishes to achieve. On the other end of the spectrum, in terms
of attacker strength, the Carlini Wagner attack [1] optimises
for data misclassification and simultaneously keeping the
introduced perturbation as small as possible. This attack can
operate under any of the three constraints.
Defences against adversarial examples are an active area
of research using ideas from robust training [2], uncertainty
[11], intermediate layer data representations [12], [13], or
removing adversarial perturbations [14]. However, there is still
no silver bullet to defending against all adversarial examples
with techniques only working if the attacker is oblivious to
their presence [15] or functioning effectively only against
specific perturbation thresholds [2].
B. Related Work for Intrusion Detection Systems
Machine learning can be used to detect anomalies in indus-
trial control systems. Such detection systems often function
in an autoregressive manner. Based on data at time steps
x0, ..., xt a prediction yt+1 is made for xt+1. This prediction is
compared to what is actually observed and the difference forms
a residual, rt+1. A detection function Fd is then employed
to determine if an attack is occurring. Fd represents any
operations which are computed on the residuals in order to
generate an alert; examples include averaging, smoothing, and
thresholding. The exact machine learning model and detection
function vary across different works.
For example, long short-term memory (LSTM) networks
were investigated in [16]–[18] for detecting cyber-physical
attacks in the SWaT system with the best LSTM achieving
a F1 score of 0.802. A different approach was taken in [19]
which investigated the Gas Pipeline dataset [20] combining a
filtering step followed by an LSTM prediction stage. If the
observed data was not in the top 4 LSTM predictions then it
was flagged as anomalous.
Many other architectures have been investigated. Among
these, convolution neural networks [16] have shown to be
able to give high F1 scores. Alternatively, autoencoders have
been investigated [21], [22] as well as examinations into neural
architecture search [23].
Recent work in [24] generated adversarial attacks for ICS
when attacking an autoencoder IDS. In the white box case, the
attacker queries the detector and substitutes the original data
for sensor readings within normal sensor range. The potential
perturbation applied in this way could be extremely large, as
every sensor reading could be replaced from an arbitrary initial
value during an attack, with a value that is within normal
sensor range. Alternatively, generative methods can be used
to create adversarial attacks such as in [25] where generative
adversarial networks (GAN) were used to create adversarial
data.
Concurrent work in [21] investigated adversarial attacks to
target an autoencoder IDS. Unlike [24], the work in [21]
modelled their attacker as not having control of the commu-
nications to the IDS independently of the programmable logic
controller and so the adversarial data had to simultaneously
fool the IDS and still fulfill the original cyber-physical attack.
With this attack objective, even though the attacker had white
box knowledge of the IDS and perfect knowledge of future
values of the system, an effective adversarial attack was not
found.
III. INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
To analyze the vulnerability of a time series based IDS to
adversarial attacks we use the SWaT dataset [26] which is
gathered on a water treatment ICS. There have been several
detection systems proposed for the SWaT dataset [16], [18],
[23], [27]. For this work, we train a LSTM [28] as our IDS
as it represents a good literature baseline.
A. Model
For the LSTM IDS we divide the data into sliding windows
of 100 time steps. At each time step, t, the LSTM makes a
prediction, yt+1, for the next system state, xt+1, based on the
past datapoints x1, . . . , xt thus functioning in a sequence to
sequence manner.
We used an LSTM with four layers, each with 512 hidden
units and a dropout rate of 0.5 between layers. A set of dense
layers takes the LSTM’s output at every time step and produces
predictions for every feature.
At test time we take the difference between the predicted
and observed values to form a series of residuals, r1, . . . , rt,
for every predicted feature. We assume that the errors are nor-
mally distributed and so we compute means, µ, and standard
deviations, σ, of residuals on the validation data. The positive,
Rpt , and negative, R
n
t , residuals are then computed based on
Rpt = max(0, rt − µ− σ) (1)
Rnt = min(0, rt − µ+ σ). (2)
Finally, we perform two cumulative sums over a sliding
window containing 10 timesteps for both Rp1...t and R
n
1...t. If
the cumulative sum then exceeds a threshold across any of the
predicted features then an anomaly is declared.
B. Data Processing
For pre-processing we normalise continuous values to have
zero mean, unit variance, and one-hot encoded categorical val-
ues. We remove features that have a constant value throughout
the training and validation sets. Such data will not contribute to
learning anything of significance and attacks on those features
can be trivially detected by a straightforward check on the
state of those actuators. We divide the data, 80% for training
and 20% for validation.
Additionally, we saw that large parts of the test dataset
which was marked as “normal” was fundamentally different
from the training/validation data. Consider the sensor feature
AIT201 as shown in Figure 1. We can see that the test
data only remains in the range spanned by the training and
validation data for a short period of time. In Figure 1 we
removed the data marked as “Attack” and so all of the data
shown represents normal behaviour. As the normal test data
distribution is fundamentally different from the training data
it is flagged as anomalous.
Fig. 1: Left: Training and validation data for the AIT201
sensor. Right: Test time data, the green area indicates the range
spanned by the training and validation data.
Some works use test time statistics to normalise the test
data and so sidestep the problem [17], [27] however that is
generally poor practice. To address this issue we only use
the features that relate to physical system properties in our
IDS, i.e. flow and water level sensors as well as mechanical
pumps and values. These features did not experience such
large deviations compared to many of the sensors relating to
chemical properties of the water.
Concurrently with our work, the authors in [21] also noticed
that there is a discrepancy between the test and training
datasets for non-anomalous data. In their work they proposed
the use of a modified Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to filter out
such features.
Finally, although we feed into the IDS the sensor and
actuator states, we only monitor the sensors for anomalies.
This is a simplifying step which relates to the nature of
crafting the adversarial attacks. As the optimisation algorithm
we employ is only applicable to continuous values, restricting
ourselves to monitoring only continuous data allows us more
flexibility when choosing which sensor feature to compromise.
C. IDS Results
Following the data pre-processing, we trained our LSTM
and evaluated its performance on the SWaT test set. We fed
the data in T second long sequential windows to the IDS. If
in the most recent window an anomaly was detected we reset
the LSTM’s internal state, otherwise we used the LSTM in
a stateful manner between successive windows. This allowed
for fewer cold starts to be experienced by the LSTM over the
normal operation of the SWaT system. However, if an anomaly
was encountered, we did not wish the anomaly to keep
affecting the LSTM’s internal state after the attack has ended,
hence our re-initialisations. The time window T is one of the
hyperparameters determining the sensitivity of the detector.
Shorter time windows are more prone to re-initialising the
IDS as, at an extreme of T = 1, whenever an anomaly is
triggered it will cause the LSTM to re-initialise. While at large
values of T multiple anomalies would only cause a single
re-initialisation. However, longer time windows can maintain
attack after-effects for longer and so drive up the false positive
rate. We did a small grid search of T = {25, 50, 100, 150} and
50 gave the best result.
We then tuned our detection thresholds by taking the
cumulative sums of residuals of non-attack data. We computed
the percentile scores and over a small grid search selected
the 99.6th percentile score as the threshold for 6 sensors and
99.7th percentile score for the remaining 7 sensors. The results
are in Table I and our LSTM based detection system achieves
and F1 score of 0.8175 making it competitive with other
literature baselines.
IV. EVALUATION ANALYSIS
A. Data Leakage Study
In a real world deployment, all of the methods cited in
Table I, as well as ours, would most likely perform differently
than the F1 scores would suggest. Currently, there is no
distinct validation set with attacks, nor a established method
of generating one. So all of the examined works, as well as
our model, either perform hyperparameter tuning on the whole
attack dataset to optimise for F1 performance or, in addition,
use test time statistics. Effectively, this treats the attack set,
which we test on, as a validation dataset. So, unless the attack
set is fully descriptive of all the attacks that could occur, the F1
scores will vary when presented with completely new attacks.
We show experimental results investigating this effect. The
attack dataset is split into a series of 50 second long windows,
and from those windows we randomly select 20% to form
a separate validation set and the rest we use for testing.
We generate the thresholds based on the randomly selected
20%. As the validation set in this situation closely mirrors
the remaining 80% of the test set we achieve an F1 score of
0.8166, which is comparable to tuning hyperparameters based
on all of the attack set. In this evaluation, we used a stateless
LSTM between datapoints as the data will not be continuous.
However, if a continuous 20% segment is chosen and
hyperparameters are tuned on it then the results can vary
significantly. We conduct the following procedure:
Method F1 score
MLP [23] 0.812
SVM [17] 0.796
DNN [17] 0.802
MADGAN [27] 0.77
Various [16] 0.609 - 0.775
Autoencoders [21] 0.873
Ours 0.8175
TABLE I: Results for different literature benchmarks. For the
work in [16] we report the performance of non ensemble
methods from their result table.
• Divide the attack dataset into five equally sized continu-
ous segments. Therefore, segment one contains the data
in the first 0% - 20% of the attack dataset, segment two
contains data in the 20% - 40% range, etc.
• Tune hyperparameters based on one of the segments.
• Report F1 performance on the the following combina-
tions:
– The remaining four test segments evaluated individ-
ually.
– The remaining four test segments combined.
– All five segments combined.
We can see from Table II that if the defender experiences
novel attacks which they have not tuned on then the results
are, as expected, worse than using all of the attack data.
Furthermore, which segment the defender has access to causes
itself variation across the F1 scores. Take as an example the
final 80% - 100% of the data. On one hand, if the thresholds
are chosen based on the first 20% of the data then an F1
score of 0.372 is achieved on it. However, if the thresholds
are computed on itself, i.e. the final 80% - 100% of the data,
then the F1 score becomes 0.642.
This presents an interesting area of future research, as novel
attacks on which we have not tuned our hyperparameters can
have unexpected properties which causes our F1 scores to vary
significantly. As there is no guarantee that the attacks created
in a attack dataset form a full representation of any attack
that could occur, then F1 performance variations are to be
expected.
To provide a baseline to address this we implemented a
method to generate thresholds which does not rely on the
attack data, test time statistics, or optimising for F1 score.
Not relying on any attack data can be of practical importance
to real world deployment. Unless a ICS operator is willing to
generate a set of attacks to deploy a IDS, then all we have
available is data of the system under normal operation.
We begin by taking our validation data, and we wish to
account for normal system behaviour which deviates from its
data. To that end we introduce noise by randomly selecting
a time step from a 100 second window and replacing it with
data drawn from a different 100 second window. We run the
validation data though our model and select our thresholds
based on the maximum and minimum cumulative residuals.
Data Split (%) F1 Score
0 - 20 0.526 0.469 0.400 0.479 0.461
20 - 40 0.186 0.251 0.188 0.200 0.189
40 - 60 0.897 0.879 0.941 0.895 0.889
60 - 80 0.313 0.404 0.320 0.591 0.308
80 - 100 0.372 0.552 0.586 0.627 0.642
Test Segments Combined 0.705 0.770 0.393 0.787 0.734
All Segments Combined 0.694 0.737 0.782 0.776 0.727
TABLE II: Results for different validation / test splits on
the SWaT attack dataset. Bold numbers under the F1 score
indicates which split was used for the validation.
Hyperparameter F1 Raw Data F1 Attack
Generation Method After-Effect Filtering
Original 0.8175 0.836
Validation Only 0.771 ± 0.006 0.811 ± 0.0103
TABLE III: F1 scores depending on how the hyperparameters
were computed and if the attack after-effects are considered
false positives. We report values based on 10 different random
noise additions when using only the validation data.
We set the time window size T of which to feed data into
the IDS to be 100, equal to the original value of the sliding
window used to train the IDS. We specifically do not tune the
window to optimise for F1 was it will lead to data leakage
from the attack set.
By running the test set data through the IDS we achieve a F1
score of 0.771± 0.006. However, it is now very important to
define precisely when an attack’s effects stop. Many attacks
have side effects which last far beyond when the attack is
labelled as finishing. This will generally lower the performance
of an IDS, as data which is anomalous, but not attack, is being
flagged and counted as a false positive. However, if we know
what the test data will be, then problem can be handled by
tuning the detection thresholds and other hyperparameters to
be less sensitive.
However, we have no such option as we are not using the
attack dataset to tune our F1 metric. Thus, in Table III we
additionally show results which do not consider anomalies
which occur immediately after an attack concludes as a false
positive. More precisely, we say that if there is a 100 second
window without any anomalies after an attack is labelled
as finishing then the attack’s secondary effects have also
ended. Any anomalies from this point are considered normally
while anomalies occurring before this condition is met are
not considered false positives. This gives an F1 score of
0.811±0.0103.
Using this procedure of considering attack after-effects on
the original detector, when its hyperparamters where tuned
in the conventional manner, caused the F1 score goes from
0.8175 to 0.836, a much more modest increase. This is, as
mentioned previously, because we are considering the attack
after-effects when hyperparameter tuning for F1 score.
B. Concept Drift Performance
As a final analysis of our IDS we examine how well it
performs on new data collected by the iTrust group in July
2019 [29]. As this is several years after the original data
was collected we can immediately see differences in the
ranges covered by sensor readings. To make the new dataset
comparable to the original one we re-computed normalisation
statistics. This was required to avoid all the data being con-
sidered anomalous by our detector through similar argument
to that described in Figure 1. Thus, we compute new means
and standard deviations based on the first 2 hours of system
operation in the July 2019 dataset which does not contain
attacks.
In addition, we re-labelled the dataset as the times provided
to indicate when attacks begin and end do not match what
we saw in the data. As an example, the first attack which
involves spoofing the FIT401 value from 0.8 to 0.5. It is
labelled as starting at 07:08:46 and finishing 07:10:31 however
the FIT401 values are all 0.8 over that period. The spoofing
actually occurs during 07:07:00 to 07:08:44. So that our results
can be reproduced in Table IV we show when we labelled as
attacks starting and stopping and the motivation for choosing
that time.
After normalising the July 2019 dataset, we feed it though
our model keeping all hyperparameters fixed. We found that
our model failed to give any meaningful results on this newer
dataset- virtually all of the data is flagged as anomalous. To
begin obtaining better results we re-trained the LSTM on
the first 7200 datapoints (corresponding to 2 hours of time)
and used the next 1000 as the validation set, and then tune
thresholds for F1 score. We achieved an F1 metric of 0.63.
By determining the thresholds without using attack data in the
manner described in section IV-A we achieve an F1 score of
0.521±0.008.
As an additional benchmark we implemented the SVM
anomaly detector model described in [17] and used the rec-
ommended hyperparameters. As described in the paper we
normalised the training and test sets with their respective
means and standard deviations. This achieved an F1 score of
0.8099 on the regular SWaT attack set. If we follow the more
strict process of normalising the training and test sets with the
training mean and standard deviation we achieve a score of
0.27709, very similar to the values reported in [17]. On the
new July 2019 dataset we tried the best three hyperparameter
combinations from [17] and the top performing SVM model
achieved an F1 score of 0.529. These scores are significantly
lower than what is achieved on the full SWaT dataset. We
attribute this to two reasons. Firstly, the new dataset is small,
thus turning the problem into one of transfer learning from
the full SWaT dataset to the new smaller set of data. Re-
training our model on the first two hours of data did help, but
more sophisticated transfer learning techniques could boost
performance further. The second potential reason for the
disparity is the warping effect of attack number 23 in the
original attack dataset. That attack is almost 10 hours in
duration containing over 63% of the total attack points, and is
one of the easiest attacks to detect. This means even a simple
detector can easily hit a recall of 0.732, even if no other attacks
are detected. However, in the new dataset all of the attacks are
over a more comparable time scale.
V. ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
Having defined and analysed the IDS we now turn our
attention to an adaptive adversarial attacker. The attacker in
our situation wishes to conduct a cyber-physical attack on an
ICS. The cyber-physical attacks are represented by the attacks
present in the SWaT dataset. An IDS can quickly detect these
attacks, and so block the intended damage.
Thus, an attacker desires to conduct their attacks while
remaining hidden from an IDS for the attack’s entire duration.
We analyse two different attacker models. Firstly, one in which
the attacker is able to compromise k sensors in the system, and,
by sending tampered data to the IDS aims to hide the dataset’s
cyber-physical attacks from the IDS. Effectively, the attacker
is operating over an L0 constraint. This type of attack could
represent a scenario when an attacker can compromise the
communication between a sensor and the IDS. For example,
in attack number 6 the water level as measured by the LIT301
sensor rapidly changes value. If the attacker can now control
the data leaving the LIT301 sensor to the IDS, how can the
data be altered in order to hide their attack? Simply reporting
a constant fixed water level of LIT301’s original measurement
still triggers an alarm as the LIT301 values are not consistent
with the rest of the system dynamics. It becomes even less
intuitive if the adversary cannot send false sensor data on
certain features. As an example, if the attacker turns on a pump
to cause a cyber-physical attack and this pump state cannot be
manipulated further, which of the sensors that trigger alerts
should the attacker compromise, and what is the perturbation
that should be added?
Secondly we consider the case where an attacker, rather
than compromising individual sensors, is able to compromise
a point on the network which enables them to modify all
the sensor readings. This could be a man-in-the-middle attack
between the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
and IDS. With this capability, the attacker could change all
the values to any desired state. However, what could be of
interest is to perturb the data by the minimum amount needed
as measured by an L∞ norm. This could be advantageous
for the attacker as if the attack requires little perturbation to
hide it from the IDS, it will also be less perceivable by a
human operator. Although the L0 attacks can fool the IDS,
often the perturbations introduced can be visibly noticeable to
an operator monitoring a human machine interface (HMI); an
example can be seen later in Figures 3a and 3b. Conversely,
L∞ attacks can be harder to spot as shown in Figure 4b.
We now define the knowledge the attacker has of the SWaT
system and then consider different attack algorithms under the
two different norms.
Attack Number Used Attack Start / End Offset from original labels Motivation
1 07:07:00 - 07:08:44 -106s / -107s The FIT401 readings change from 0.8 to 0.5 over a different time window.
2 07:13:27 - 07:17:47 -93s / -105s The LIT301 Readings change to 1024 over a different time window.
3 07:25:13 - 07:29:02 -104s / -106s The P601 pump value changes from 1 to 2 over a different time window.
4 07:37:19 - 07:44:48.00 -91s / -92s
As this attack involves two actuators being compromised at
different times, we selected the actuator changes which kept the attack
duration as close as possible to the original. Thus we declare the
attack as occurring when both actuators are compromised.
5 07:52:18 - 07:54:55.00 -102s / -65s We defined the attack as starting when MV501 entered thevalue of 0, and finished when the MV501 value was again at 2.
6 08:01:06 - 08:15:07 -110s / -111s The P301 valve changed from 2 to 1 over a different window.
TABLE IV: Attack times we used in our results for the July 2019 dataset and explanation as to why it was chosen.
A. Attacker Knowledge
We model the attacker as having white box knowledge
of the IDS and accurate knowledge of the physical system
dynamics. Knowledge of the physical system dynamics has a
large influence on the attacker strength, as if the attacker does
not know how the system evolves in time, then all the attacker
would be able to do is greedily optimise data as it arrives to
minimise the residual at t+1. After the attacker has conducted
the optimisation and sent the manipulated data to the IDS they
will be unable to retroactively make changes to the data to aid
them in keeping future attack data hidden.
However, if the attacker has an accurate model of the system
then they can predict how it will evolve over the course of their
attack. With this capability the attacker can now optimize the
data with the aim of global stealth across all time steps. We
represent this capability by assuming the attacker’s model of
the physical system yields its ground truth, but cannot generate
the appropriate sensor noise that will occur when a sensor
takes a measurement. However, we only have access to the
SWaT dataset which already has sensor noise present. Hence,
to simulate this scenario we take the values in the SWaT
dataset as the ground truth of the system and is what the
attacker’s model of the physical system gives. This dataset,
DA, is therefore the knowledge the attacker has of how the
system evolves. Then, we create a copy of the train and test
datasets and add Gaussian noise to it. We select the level of
noise based on the datasheets for the sensors used in the SWaT
system. For the flow sensor data we add Gaussian noise with a
standard deviation of 0.2% of the measured value. In the case
of the water level data we add Gaussian noise with a standard
deviation of 0.25% of the measured value or 6mm (whichever
is greater). This set of data, Dd, is what the defender will see.
Rather than having a model of the system the alternative for
the attacker in conducting their attacks is to perform them a
posteriori i.e. once the attacker has received a series of sensor
readings. However, that would be a stronger attacker model
as they will not be concerned with sensor noise as they will
have a perfect knowledge of the available data. This was the
attacker model as studied in [21].
This requirement of having an accurate physical system
model, or conducting the attacks a posteriori, is due to the fact
that the detection system declares an anomaly conditioned on
all past datapoints. This requirement depends on the IDS being
targeted. For example, in [24] a autoencoder was targeted
which considers each data-point independently, so all the
attacker needs to know is the data as it arrives sequentially.
B. Stronger Defender Model
We use the training portion of Dd to train the defender IDS
using the model and detection function described in section
III-A. For comparison to the results in Table I our LSTM
trained with Dd achieved marginally higher results with an
F1 score of 0.828. The slightly higher result may be because
adding noise resulted in slightly better regularisation, or simply
that our threshold grid search yielded better thresholds for the
this model.
We now alter our detection thresholds to make the defender
stronger against an adversarial attacker, as well as potentially
more representative of a real world detection system.
The current detection thresholds were set by considering
all of the data in the SWaT attack dataset. However, many
of the cyber physical attacks have long term effects on the
system which can require significant time to re-stabilize. This
data, although anomalous, is not labelled as an attack and so
would contribute to the false positive rate. Hence, this results
in detection thresholds being artificially raised. So, rather than
devise a system that works effectively across all the dataset
sequentially we tighten our thresholds based on data that is
clear of any secondary effects that occur after an attack has
finished.
We divide the SWaT attack dataset into sequences of data
that is “clean” of secondary effects by extracting sequences
of data whose start point is 600 seconds after an attack
finishes, and the end point is 100 seconds before an attack
begins. Empirically, 600 seconds after an attack finished was
sufficiently long (barring one case) to not observe negative
attack after-effects. Defining the end point of a “clean” data
sequence to occur 100 seconds before an attack started was
done because in some cases the attack seemingly began prior
to attack label indicating an attack was in progress. As an
example, consider the first cyber-physical attack in the dataset.
It is defined by opening the MV101 valve when it should be
closed. The attack is labelled as beginning at time 10:29:14,
but the MV101 valve changes state at 10:28:50, 28 seconds
before the attack is labelled as starting. Another example
(a) The original readings for sensor LIT301. (b) The original readings for sensor FIT201.
(c) The residuals accumulate to trigger a large alert on
the LIT301 sensor when no adversarial methods are used.
(d) The residuals accumulate to trigger an alert on the
FIT201 sensor when no adversarial methods are used..
Fig. 2: We can see here the results for the LIT301 (left plots) and FIT201 sensor (right plots) for attack number 6 when there
is no compromise in the system. Red vertical lines indicate when the attacker began and ended their optimisation and the
shaded area indicates when the cyber-physical attack was in progress. Horizontal red lines show detection thresholds.
can be seen in Figure 2a with attack number 6 where the
LIT301 sensor began reporting extremely high water level
readings before the attack labels indicated that an attack was in
progress. Finally, any resulting sequences of clean data shorter
than 1500 seconds are discarded.
As mentioned previously, we have an exception to our
heuristic of selecting clean sequences 600 seconds after an
attack finishes and 100 seconds before an attack starts. This
exception is the set of non-attack values between attacks 23
and 24. The system takes almost all of the duration between
those two attacks to return to normal operation and so we do
not use that fragment of data.
To determine our attack detection capability we extract out
from the test set time windows starting 400 seconds before an
attack starts and finishing when the attack ends. For attacks
which have a smaller window than 400 seconds between each
other we use the largest of either 100 or 25 second windows.
We run these sequences of data through our model and tune
the thresholds using the same procedure as in section III-C.
With this setup we obtain a recall of 0.821 due to the tighter
decision boundaries giving the attacker a more challenging
target. In terms of recall, which is a good measure of how
difficult a target the IDS will be for an attacker, this places us
close to the strongest literature results for dedicated defence
papers (0.821 vs 0.827 [21]). Note, that although we achieve
an F1 score of 0.872, the F1 score is not comparable to the
results in Table I as we are computing the scores by removing
sections of data in the procedure described earlier to compute
and evaluate the thresholds.
VI. ATTACK ALGORITHMS
A. L0 Optimisation Attack
In the optimisation attack the attacker sends adversarial data
on the compromised sensors to the IDS to hide the cyber phys-
ical attacks across all monitored sensors. The IDS generates
residuals r1...rN which are passed though a detection function
Fd which outputs zero if no attack is detected or ηt, which is
the magnitude by which an alert is generated. The attackers
goal is thus to minimise the detection loss LD:
LD =
t=N∑
t=0
Fd(r1 . . . rN ). (3)
Although the attacker is able to alter the data on the
compromised sensor they do not have complete freedom as
the compromised sensor itself is monitored. Specifically, the
adversarial datapoint xˆt will cause the IDS to make a pre-
diction yt+1 which must be close to the adversarial datapoint
xˆt+1. However, xˆt+1 is changing every iteration step as it is
itself being updated. This creates a dynamic that is not usually
present in static data like images, as here the optimisation
target for the attacker changes from iteration step to iteration
step.
(a) The LIT301 sensor readings when an adversary
optimises to reduce the residuals to below detection
across all sensors.
(b) The FIT201 sensor readings when an adversarial
attacker optimises to reduce the residuals to below de-
tection
(c) The LIT301 residual sums resulting from the adver-
sarial attack.
(d) The FIT201 residual sums resulting from the adver-
sarial attack.
Fig. 3: Following from the plots in Figs. 2a - 2d here we see how an adversary manipulates LIT301 data to evade detection.
This presented a challenging optimisation problem and we
used the BFGS algorithm as our optimiser [30]. Weaker
first order optimisation methods (gradient decent, Adam, etc)
did not find satisfactory solutions. This presents a deviation
from image based adversarial attacks as in the image domain
simple adversarial attacks, for example FGSM [10], are able to
achieve high success rates against undefended neural networks.
B. L0 Prediction Based Attack
This attack exploits the autoregressive nature of the LSTM
IDS and functions by feeding the LSTM’s predictions back
to itself as though it was real sensor data. More explicitly, if
the attacker has the neural network model, then at time t they
can compute the IDS’s predictions for the next time step yt+1.
Then, at t+ 1, on the sensors the attacker has compromised,
rather than sending the real data, xt+1, they send yt+1 to the
IDS- i.e at every time step they perfectly match the data they
send to the IDS with its own prediction for the system state.
This attack method does not make any active attempts to
reduce detection on additional monitored sensors and so hiding
attacks which have been detected on more sensors that the
attacker has compromised is not guaranteed to succeed.
However this method does have advantages for the attacker
in that the knowledge they need of the target system is lower.
The detection function, Fd, and a model of the physical system
dynamics are only needed here to identify which sensors
to compromise, but not to actually run the attack. In other
words, if the attacker already has a set of compromised sensors
then they can run this attack only needing the model of the
LSTM. Conversely, the other attacks described will always
need additional knowledge (such as Fd and Da) to compute
the required perturbations.
This method can be combined with the L0 optimization
attack by first running the prediction attack which provides
an initialisation closer to the final goal. In our experiments
this often led to better results when compared with starting
the optimisation attack from the original data, particularly
when a high number of features needed to be compromised to
fully hide an attack. Additionally, this attack method generates
sensor sequences which are often more plausible to a human
viewer, thereby making the attack more stealthy with the same
level of compromise as a pure optimisation approach. An
example can be seen in Figure 4b.
C. L∞ Optimisation Attack
In this attacker model we assumed that the attacker has
compromised a point in the network in which they are able
to tamper with all of the continuous sensor readings. We
examined an attacker’s capability in hiding attacks at varying
levels of an L∞ bound. If at low levels of perturbation the
cyber-physical attacks can be hidden it makes them hard to be
(a) Adversarial data when running the L0 prediction and
L0 optimisation attack for attack number 6. Compared to
Fig. 3a the adversarial data is much smoother and more
plausible.
(b) Adversarial data when running the L∞ attack for
attack number 6. Compared to Fig. 3a the adversarial
data is much smoother and more plausible.
Fig. 4: Plots showing data generated by the L0 prediction and L∞ attacks.
spotted by other means, for example a human viewing a HMI
monitor, compared to an L0 optimisation attack.
In this situation we are still constrained by the LSTM’s
monitoring of the continuous features as described in section
VI-A. However, unknown sensor noise will not affect the
attacker as they are able to perturb all of the sensor data.
VII. ADVERSARIAL ATTACK RESULTS
For every attack in the dataset we begin optimising either
400, 100, or 25 seconds before the cyber-physical attack begins
to aid in hiding the initial portion of the attack. The largest
time window was chosen which did not contain a false positive
and did not begin during a previous attack.
A. L0 Constrained Attacks
For the L0 constrained attacker we need to determine which
features the attacker should compromise. Hence, we select
features based on the detection loss LD computed on the
dataset Da which the attacker controls. Note, from Section
V-A that the dataset Da differs from the dataset which the
defender will see Dd due to the addition of extra sensor noise.
We then run the L0 optimisation attack and if the detection
loss is greater than zero we increase the level of compromise
by including the feature with the highest level of detection
loss post-optimisation. This continues iteratively until, based
on the attacker dataset Da, the attacker has zero detection loss.
For each cyber-physical attack we explore three strategies:
• Use only the L0 prediction attack.
• Use only the L0 optimisation attack.
• Use the L0 prediction attack and then apply the L0
optimisation attack.
Once zero detection loss is achieved on Da we check for
pruning of the compromised features. As the compromised fea-
ture ki was selected conditioned on the compromised features
k0, . . . , ki−1 the effect of more recent compromised features
ki+1, . . . , ki+n may make the compromise of feature ki
unneeded. Thus, we iterate backwards removing compromised
features beginning at ki+n−1 and checking that zero detection
loss is still achieved. If it is achieved we remove ki from the
features needing compromise.
The manipulated data then replaces the appropriate features
in the defender’s dataset Dd and it is run through the IDS.
If the attack achieves zero detection loss then the attack
was successful. However, due to unknown sensor noise in
uncompromised features the attack may fail. To account for
this unknown noise the attacker optimises to 90% of the
threshold values. The principle behind this is that if an attack
can be optimised to lie below 90% of the real detection
threshold, then even if there is some additional noise, it will
not drive the cumulative residuals above the full detection
threshold. This heuristic worked for all bar one case: in attack
number 26 the detection loss was zero when using Da but,
when substituting the appropriate data into Dd there was a
detection loss of 0.0497 down from an original detection loss
of 356.79.
The full set of results is shown in Table V in which we show
the minimum compromise needed to generate an adversarial
attack. If different attack algorithms resulted in the same level
of compromise we state the best algorithm to use according
to the following rankings:
1) L0 Prediction attack: this attack requires only the LSTM
model to function and generates plausible looking sensor
measurements. Additionally, it can be run without Da
and Fd if a set of compromised sensors has already been
identified.
2) L0 Prediction followed by L0 Optimisation: here we
require a high level of knowledge, but still maintain
plausible sensor measurements.
3) L0 Optimisation attack: requires a high level of knowl-
edge, and a human may spot that the sensor readings are
not realistic. This may not matter if the attack is quick, or
if a human operator is not part of the defensive structure
of the targeted plant.
On average 2.48 compromised sensors are required to hide a
cyber-physical attack out of 12 total sensors. Broadly, the more
features over which an attack is detected the more features
Fig. 5: The number of monitored features which triggered an
alert against the level of compromise needed to hide the attack.
need compromising: on average attacks which were detected
on 6 or more sensors required 4.5 sensors to be compromised
while attacks which were detected on less than 6 sensors
required 1.4 compromised sensors. From Figure 5 we can
see that the number of sensors which detected an attack was
occurring provides an indication to the number of features
requiring compromise, and so can give the attacker an estimate
of how much system compromise will be required.
To gain a better feel for how the attack modifies the data
we show a portion of attack number 6 in Figures 2a - 3d. We
show two sensors which trigger an alert in response to the
attack. Figures 2a and 2b show how the observed readings for
sensors LIT301 and FIT201 differ from the predicted values
generating large residuals shown in Figures 2c and 2d which
go above the detection thresholds.
The attacker is then able to compromise the LIT301 sensor
and optimises to keep the residuals hidden across all of the
sensors which triggered an anomaly (LIT301, LIT101, FIT201,
FIT504). In Figure 3a we see what the observed values become
for the LIT301 sensor to achieve this. Then, in Figure 3b
we see the effect this has had on the predicted values for
FIT201 and they now match very closely to the observed
values. Finally, in the last two Figures 3c and 3d we see that
the residuals have been reduced to as to not trigger an alert.
B. L∞ Constrained Attacks
For the L∞ constrained attack we begin to iteratively in-
crease the perturbation level from  = 0.025 until the attack is
hidden. The range of perturbations needed for different attacks
varied significantly, some attacks such as attack number 3
were immediately hidden with a perturbation of 0.025 while
others, such as attack number 8, required an enormous levels
of perturbation.
We show in Figure 6 the level of perturbation required
against the detection loss of the various attacks. We can see
that as the level of detection increases the higher the required
level of perturbation. In effect this means certain attacks
require such a high level of perturbation that the attacker can
do as they wish. However, there are a set of attacks which can
Fig. 6: Plots examining the detection loss against the L∞
bound required to hide the attack. For a subset of attacks the
amount of perturbation required is extremely large. On the
right we can see a zoomed in plot of the attacks that require
lower levels of perturbation. Attacks which occur back to back
in the attack set are considered together (attacks 8 + 9 and
22 + 23). See Table V for more details. Not shown is attack
22 + 23 due to its loss of over 4 × 106 skewing the axis. It
required a perturbation of 10.0.
be hidden with a relatively low amount of perturbation shown
on the right of Figure 6.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have presented a method for generating adversarial at-
tacks on time series IDS. Although intrusion detection systems
can be fooled they require a higher degree of perturbation and
stronger optimisation strategies in comparison to adversarial
samples in the image domain. For future work we will examine
how to extend our attack algorithms to deal with mixtures of
discrete and continuous data.
Additionally, we discussed the effects of using the whole
attack set to generate hyperparameter choices when optimising
for the F1 score. If the attack set is fully descriptive of all
potential attacks that occur then there is no problem with this
practice. If not then our F1 performance can vary significantly.
As we have no guarantee that our datasets are fully descriptive
in terms of attacks examining how we can make robust
detectors using less ICS attack data is an interesting avenue
for future work.
Finally, we presented results on examining the effects of
concept drift in the SWaT system with the newly released July
2019 dataset. Our detector and a implementation of a simple
literature baseline performed worse compared to the original
SWaT attack set. This indicates an additional line of research
where better methods for handling concept drift need to be
investigated for ICS.
TABLE V: Complete Table of Results. Attack pairs 8 / 9 and 22 / 23 occur back to back in the attack dataset with no time
between them. We state the results for detection when considering the attacks separately and together (8 + 9 and 22 + 23).
For our adversary we consider the back to back attacks together forming as a single longer attack as it would be unrealistic
for an attacker to begin optimising to hide an attack when the system was already in an unstable state from a previous attack
which was detected immediately beforehand. Notes: for attack 22 + 23 we used the L-BFGS-B algorithm rather than BFGS
due to computational constraints.
Attack Number Num of Channels with
Detection
Num of Compromised
Channels to Hide Attack
Adversarial Method Used
1 2 1 L0 Prediction
2 1 1 L0 Prediction
3 1 1 L0 Prediction
4 NA NA NA
5 NA NA NA
6 4 1 Initialised with L0 Prediction,followed by L0 Optimisation
7 9 3 Initialised with L0 Prediction,followed by L0 Optimisation
8 + 9 11 5 Initialised with L0 Prediction,followed by L0 Optimisation
8 10 NA NA
9 11 NA NA
10 0 NA
11 0 NA NA
12 2 2 L0 Prediction
13 3 2 L0 Optimisation
14 0 NA NA
15 0 NA NA
16 1 1 L0 Prediction
17 11 5 Initialised with L0 Prediction,followed by L0 Optimisation
18 0 NA NA
19 0 NA NA
20 3 1 L0 Prediction
21 4 2 L0 Prediction
22 + 23 12 10 Initialised with L0 Prediction,followed by L0 Optimisation
22 8 NA NA
23 11 NA NA
24 0 NA NA
25 3 2 L0 Prediction
26 5 NA Attack Fails due to sensor noise
27 4 1 L0 Optimisation
28 3 2 Initialised with L0 Prediction,followed by L0 Optimisation
29 0 NA NA
30 1 1 L0 Prediction
31 5 2 L0 Optimisation
32 12 5 Initialised with L0 Prediction,followed by L0 Optimisation
33 2 1 L0 Optimisation
34 10 2 Initialised with L0 Prediction,followed by L0 Optimisation
35 9 5 Initialised with L0 Prediction,followed by L0 Optimisation
36 7 1 L0 Prediction
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